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Abstract. Given the ability to directly manipulate image pixels in the digital in-
put space, an adversary can easily generate imperceptible perturbations to fool a
Deep Neural Network (DNN) image classifier, as demonstrated in prior work. In
this work, we propose ShapeShifter, an attack that tackles the more challenging
problem of crafting physical adversarial perturbations to fool image-based object
detectors like Faster R-CNN. Attacking an object detector is more difficult than
attacking an image classifier, as it needs to mislead the classification results in
multiple bounding boxes with different scales. Extending the digital attack to the
physical world adds another layer of difficulty, because it requires the perturba-
tion to be robust enough to survive real-world distortions due to different viewing
distances and angles, lighting conditions, and camera limitations. We show that
the Expectation over Transformation technique, which was originally proposed
to enhance the robustness of adversarial perturbations in image classification, can
be successfully adapted to the object detection setting. ShapeShifter can generate
adversarially perturbed stop signs that are consistently mis-detected by Faster R-
CNN as other objects, posing a potential threat to autonomous vehicles and other
safety-critical computer vision systems.
Keywords: Adversarial attack · Object detection · Faster R-CNN
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are input instances that are intentionally designed to fool a ma-
chine learning model into producing a chosen prediction. The success of Deep Neural
Network (DNN) in computer vision does not exempt it from this threat. It is possi-
ble to bring the accuracy of a state-of-the-art DNN image classifier down to near zero
percent by adding imperceptible adversarial perturbations [23,5]. The existence of ad-
versarial examples not only reveals intriguing theoretical properties of DNN, but also
raises serious practical concerns on its deployment in security and safety critical sys-
tems. Autonomous vehicle is an example application that cannot be fully trusted before
guaranteeing the robustness to adversarial attacks. The imperative need to understand
the vulnerabilities of DNNs attracts tremendous interest among machine learning, com-
puter vision, and security researchers.
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Fig. 1: Illustration motivating the need of physical adversarial attack, from attackers’
perspectives, as they typically do not have full control over the computer vision system
pipeline.
Although many adversarial attack algorithms have been proposed, attacking a real-
world computer vision system is difficult. First of all, most of the existing attack al-
gorithms only focus on the image classification task, yet in many real-world use cases
there will be more than one object in an image. Object detection, which recognizes and
localizes multiple objects in an image, is a more suitable model for many vision-based
scenarios. Attacking an object detector is more difficult than attacking an image clas-
sifier, as it needs to mislead the classification results in multiple bounding boxes with
different scales [14].
Further difficulty comes from the fact that DNN is usually only a component in
the whole computer vision system pipeline. For many applications, attackers usually
do not have the ability to directly manipulate data inside the pipeline. Instead, they
can only manipulate the things outside of the system, i.e., those things in the physical
environment. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind physical adversarial attacks. To be
successful attacks, physical adversarial attacks must be robust enough to survive real-
world distortions due to different viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions, and
camera limitations.
There has been prior work that can either attack object detectors digitally [24], or
attack image classifiers physically [10,19,6]. However, so far the existing attempts to
physically attack object detectors remain unsatisfactory. A perturbed stop sign is shown
in [13] that cannot be detected by the Faster R-CNN object detector [18]. However,
the perturbation is very large and they tested it with poor texture contrast against the
background, making the perturbed stop sign hard to see even by human. A recent short
note [7] claims to be able to generate some adversarial stickers that, when attaching to
a stop sign, can fool the YOLO object detector [17] and can be transferable to also fool
Faster R-CNN. However, they did not reveal the algorithm used to create the sticker and
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only show a video of indoor experiment with short distance3. For other threat models
of adversarial attacks in computer vision, we refer the readers to the survey of [1].
In this work, we propose ShapeShifter, the first robust targeted attack that can fool a
state-of-the-art Faster R-CNN object detector. To make the attack robust, we adopt the
Expectation over Transformation technique [3,4], and adapt it from the image classifi-
cation task to the object detection setting. As a case study, we generate some adversari-
ally perturbed stop signs that can consistently be mis-detected by Faster R-CNN as the
target objects in real drive-by tests. Our contributions are summarized below.
1.1 Our Contributions
– To the best of knowledge, our work presents the first reproducible and robust tar-
geted attack against Faster R-CNN [14]. Recent attempts either can only do untar-
geted attack and requires perturbations with “extreme patterns” (in the researchers’
words) to work consistently [13], or has not revealed the details of the method [7].
We have open-sourced our code on GitHub4.
– We show that the Expectation over Transformation technique, originally proposed
for image classification, can be applied in the object detection task and significantly
enhance robustness of the resulting perturbation.
– By carefully studying the Faster R-CNN object detector algorithm, we overcome
non-differentiability in the model, and successfully perform optimization-based at-
tacks using gradient descent and backpropogation.
– We generate perturbed stop signs that can consistently fool Faster R-CNN in real
drive-by tests (videos available on the GitHub repository), calling for imperative
need to improve and fortify vision-based object detectors.
2 Background
This section provides background information of adversarial attacks and briefly de-
scribes the Faster R-CNN object detector that we try to attack in this work.
2.1 Adversarial Attack
Given a trained machine learning modelC and a benign instance x ∈ X that is correctly
classified by C, the goal of the untargeted adversarial attack is to find another instance
x′ ∈ X , such that C(x′) 6= C(x) and d(x, x′) ≤  for some distance metric d(·, ·) and
perturbation budget  > 0. For targeted attack, we further require C(x′) = y′ where
y′ 6= C(x) is the target class. Common distance metrics d(·, ·) in the computer vision
domain are `2 distance d(x, x′) = ||x− x′||22 and `∞ distance d(x, x′) = ||x− x′||∞.
The work of [23] was the first to discover the existence of adversarial examples for
DNNs. Several subsequent works have improved the computational cost and made the
3 Three months after our work appeared on arXiv, the authors of [7] revealed their approaches
in a separate paper [21] and discussed the differences with our work.
4 https://github.com/shangtse/robust-physical-attack
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perturbation highly imperceptible to human [8,15]. Most adversarial attack algorithms
against DNNs assume that the model is differentiable, and use the gradient information
of the model to tweak the input instance to achieve the desired model output [5]. Sharif
et al. [19] first demonstrated a physically realizable attack to fool a face recognition
model by wearing an adversarially crafted pair of glasses.
2.2 Faster R-CNN
Faster R-CNN [18] is one of the state-of-the-art general object detectors. It adopts a 2-
stage detection strategy. In the first state, a region proposal network is used to generate
several class-agnostic bounding boxes called region proposals that may contain objects.
In the second stage, a classifier and a regressor are used to output the classification
results and refined bounding box coordinates for each region proposal, respectively.
The computation cost is significantly reduced by sharing the convolutional layers in the
two stages. Faster R-CNN is much harder to attack, as a single object can be covered by
multiple region proposals of different sizes and aspect ratios, and one needs to mislead
the classification results in all the region proposals to fool the detection.
3 Threat Model
Existing methods that generate adversarial examples typically yield imperceptible per-
turbations that fool a given machine learning model. Our work, following [19], gener-
ates perturbations that are perceptible but constrained such that a human would not be
easily fooled by such a perturbation. We examine this kind of perturbation in the context
of object detection (e.g., stop sign). We chose this use case because of object detector’s
possible uses in security-related and safety-related settings (e.g., autonomous vehicles).
For example, attacks on traffic sign recognition could cause a car to miss a stop sign or
travel faster than legally allowed.
We assume the adversary has white-box level access to the machine learning model.
This means the adversary has access to the model structure and weights to the degree
that the adversary can both compute outputs (i.e., the forward pass) and gradients (i.e.,
the backward pass). It also means that the adversary does not have to construct a per-
turbation in real-time. Rather, the adversary can study the model and craft an attack
for that model using methods like Carlini-Wagner attack [5]. This kind of adversary is
distinguished from a black-box adversary who is defined as having no such access to
the model architecture or weights. While our choice of adversary is the most powerful
one, existing research has shown it is possible to construct imperceptible perturbations
without white-box level access [16]. However, whether our method is capable of gen-
erating perceptible perturbations with only black-box access remains an open question.
Results from Liu et al. [12] suggest that iterative attacks (like ours) tend not to transfer
as well as non-iterative attacks.
Unlike previous work, we restrict the adversary such that they cannot manipulate the
digital values of pixels gathered from the camera that each use case uses to sense the
world. This is an important distinction from existing imperceptible perturbation meth-
ods. Because those methods create imperceptible perturbations, there is a high likeli-
hood such perturbations would not fool our use cases when physically realized. That
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is, when printed and then presented to the systems in our use cases, those perturbations
would have to survive both the printing process and sensing pipeline in order to fool
the system. This is not an insurmountable task as Kurakin et al. [10] have constructed
such imperceptible yet physically realizable adversarial perturbations for image classi-
fication systems.
Finally, we also restrict our adversary by limiting the shape of the perturbation the
adversary can generate. This is important distinction for our use cases because one could
easily craft an odd-shaped “stop sign” that does not exist in the real world. We also do
not give the adversary the latitude of modifying all pixels in an image like Kurakin et
al. [10], but rather restrict them to certain pixels that we believe are both inconspicuous
and physically realistic.
4 Attack Method
Our attack method, ShapeShifter, is inspired by the iterative, change-of-variable attack
described in [5] and the Expectation over Transformation technique [3,4]. Both methods
were originally proposed for the task of image classification. We describe these two
methods in the image classification setting before showing how to extend them to attack
the Faster R-CNN object detector.
4.1 Attacking an Image Classifier
Let F : [−1, 1]h×w×3 → RK be an image classifier that takes an image of height h
and width w as input, and outputs a probability distribution over K classes. The goal
of the attacker is to create an image x′ that looks like an object x of class y, but will be
classified as another target class y′.
Change-of-variable Attack Denote LF (x, y) = L(F (x), y) as the loss function that
calculates the distance between the model output F (x) and the target label y. Given an
original input image x and a target class y′, the change-of-variable attack [5] propose
the following optimization formulation.
argmin
x′∈Rh×w×3
LF (tanh(x
′), y′) + c · || tanh(x′)− x||22. (1)
The use of tanh ensures that each pixel is between [−1, 1]. The constant c controls the
similarity between the modified object x′ and the original image x. In practice, c can be
determined by binary search [5].
Expectation over Transformation The Expectation over Transformation [3,4] idea
is simple: adding random distortions in each iteration of the optimization to make the
resulting perturbation more robust. Given a transformation t that can be translation, ro-
tation, and scaling, Mt(xb, xo) is an operation that transforms an object image xo using
t and then overlays it onto a background image xb.Mt(xb, xo) can also include a mask-
ing operation that only keeps a certain area of xo. This will be helpful when one wants
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to restrict the shape of the perturbation. After incorporating the random distortions,
equation (1) becomes
argmin
x′∈Rh×w×3
Ex∼X,t∼T [LF (Mt(x, tanh(x′)), y′)] + c · || tanh(x′)− xo||22, (2)
where X is the training set of background images. When the model F is differentiable,
this optimization problem can be solved by gradient descent and back-propagation. The
expectation can be approximated by the empirical mean.
4.2 Extension to Attacking Faster R-CNN
An object detector F : [−1, 1]h×w×3 → (RN×K ,RN×4) takes an image as input and
outputs N detected objects. Each detection includes a probability distribution over K
pre-defined classification classes as well as the location of the detected object, repre-
sented by its 4 coordinates. Note that it is possible for an object detector to output more
or fewer detected objects, depending on the input image, but for simplicity we select
top-N detected objects ranked by confidence.
As described in subsection 2.2, Faster R-CNN adopts a 2-stage approach. The re-
gion proposal network in the first stage outputs several region proposals, and the sec-
ond stage classifier performs classification within each of the region proposals. Let
rpn(x) = {r1, . . . , rm}, where each ri is a region proposal represented as its four
coordinates, and let xr be a sub-image covered by region r. Denote LFi(x, y) =
L(F (xri), y) the loss of the classification in the i-th region proposal. We simultaneously
attack all the classifications in each region proposal by the following optimization.
argmin
x′∈Rh×w×3
Ex∼X,t∼T
 1
m
∑
ri∈rpn(Mt(x′))
LFi(Mt(x
′), y′)
+c·|| tanh(x′)−xo||22, (3)
where we abuse the notation Mt(x′) = Mt(x, tanh(x′)) for simplicity. However, for
computational issues, most models prune the region proposals by using heuristics like
non-maximum suppression [18]. The pruning operations are usually non-differentiable,
making it hard to optimize equation (3) end to end. Therefore, we approximately solve
this optimization problem by first run a forward pass of the region proposal network, and
fixed the pruned region proposals as fixed constants to the second stage classification
problem in each iteration. We empirically find this approximation sufficient to find a
good solution.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate our method by fooling a pre-trained Faster R-CNN model with Inception-
v2 [22] convolutional feature extraction component. The model was trained on the Mi-
crosoft Common Objects in Context (MS-COCO) dataset [11] and is publicly available
in the Tensorflow Object Detection API [9] model zoo repository5.
5 http://download.tensorflow.org/models/object_detection/faster_
rcnn_inception_v2_coco_2017_11_08.tar.gz
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The MS-COCO dataset contains 80 general object classes ranging from people and
animals to trucks and cars and other common objects. Although our method can poten-
tially be used to attack any classes, we choose to focus on attacking the stop sign class
due to its importance and relevance to self-driving cars, where a vision-based object
detector may be used to help make decisions. An additional benefit of choosing the stop
sign is its flat shape that can easily be printed on a paper. Other classes, like dogs, are
less likely to be perceived as real objects by human when printed on a paper. While 3D
printing adversarial examples for image recognition is possible [3], we leave 3D-printed
adversarial examples against object detectors as future work.
5.1 Digitally Perturbed Stop Sign
We generate adversarial stop signs by performing the optimization process described in
Equation 3. The hyperparameter c is crucial in determining the perturbation strength. A
smaller value of c will result in a more conspicuous perturbation, but the perturbation
will also be more robust to real-world distortions when we do the physical attack later.
However, it is hard to choose an appropriate c when naively using the `2 distance
to a real stop sign as regularization. To obtain a robust enough perturbation, a very
small c needs to be used, which has the consequence of creating stop signs that are
difficult for humans to recognize. The `2 distance is not a perfect metric for human
perception, which tends to be more sensitive to color changes on lighter-colored objects.
Due to this observation, we only allow the perturbation to change the red part of the
stop sign, leaving the white text intact. This allows us to generate larger and more robust
perturbation, while providing enough contrast between the lettering and red parts so that
a human can easily recognize the perturbation as a stop sign. The adversarial stop sign
generated in [13] does not consider this and is visually more conspicuous. Automating
this procedure for other objects we leave as future work.
We performed two targeted attacks and one untargeted attack. We choose person
and sports ball as the two target classes because they are relatively similar in size and
shape to stop signs. Our method allows attackers to use any target classes, however the
perturbation needs to achieve its means and fool the object detector. For some target
classes, this may mean creating perturbations so large in deviation that they may appear
radically different from the victim class. We also noticed that some classes are easier
to be detected at small scales, such as kite, while other classes (e.g., truck) could not
be detected when the object was too small. This may be an artifact of the MS-COCO
dataset that the object detector was trained on. Nevertheless, ultimately the attacker has
a choice in target class and, given ample time, can find the target class that best fools
the object detector according to their means.
For each attack, we generated a high confidence perturbation and a low level per-
turbation. The high confidence perturbations were generated using a smaller value of
c, thus making them more conspicuous but also more robust. Depending upon the tar-
get class, it may be difficult to generate an effective perturbation. We manually chose c
for each target class so that the digital attack achieves high success rate while keeping
the perturbation not too conspicuous, i.e., we tried to keep the color as red as possible.
We used c = 0.002 for the high confidence perturbations and c = 0.005 for the low
confidence perturbations in the “sports ball” targeted attack and the untargeted attack.
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(a) Person (low) (b) Sports ball (low) (c) Untargeted (low)
(d) Person (high) (e) Sports ball (high) (f) Untargeted (high)
Fig. 2: Digital perturbations we created using our method. Low confidence perturbations
on the top and high confidence perturbations on the bottom.
We used c = 0.005 and c = 0.01 for the high and low confidence perturbations in
the “person” targeted attack, respectively. The 6 perturbations we created are shown in
Figure 2.
5.2 Physical Attack
We performed physical attacks on the object detector by printing out the perturbed stop
signs shown in Figure 2. We then took photos from a variety of distances and angles in
a controlled indoor setting. We also conducted drive-by tests by recording videos from
a moving vehicle that approached the signs from a distance. The lightning conditions
varied from recording to recording depending upon the weather at the time.
Equipment We used a Canon Pixma Pro-100 photo printer to print out signs with high-
confidence perturbations, and an HP DesignJet to print out those with low-confidence
perturbations6. For static images, we used a Canon EOS Rebel T7i DSLR camera,
equipped with a EF-S 18-55mm IS STM lens. The videos in our drive-by tests are
shot using an iPhone 8 Plus mounted on the windshield of a car.
Indoor Experiments Following the experimental setup of [6], we took photos of the
printed adversarial stop sign, at a variety of distances (5’ to 40’) and angles (0◦, 15◦,
6 We used two printers to speed up our sign production, since a sign can take more than 30
minutes to produce.
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Fig. 3: Indoor experiment setup. We take photos of the printed adversarial sign, from
multiple angles (0◦, 15◦, 30◦, 45◦, 60◦, from the sign’s tangent), and distances (5’ to
40’). The camera locations are indicated by the red dots, and the camera always points
at the sign.
30◦, 45◦, 60◦, from the sign’s tangent). This setup is depicted in Figure 3 where camera
locations are indicated by red dots. The camera always pointed at the sign. We intended
these distance-angle combinations to mimic a vehicle’s points of view as it would ap-
proach the sign from a distance [13]. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the results for our
high-confidence and low-confidence perturbations, respectively. For each distance-angle
combination, we show the detected class and the detection’s confidence score. If more
than one bounding boxes are detected, we report the highest-scoring one. Confidence
values lower than 30% were considered undetected; we decided to use the threshold of
30%, instead of the default 50% in the Tensorflow Object Detection API [9], to impose
a stricter requirement on ourselves (the “attacker”). Since an object can be detected as
a stop sign and the target class simultaneously, we consider our attack to be success-
ful only when the confidence score of the target class is the highest among all of the
detected classes.
Table 1 shows that our high-confidence perturbations achieve a high attack success
rate at a variety of distances and angles. For example, we achieved a targeted success
rate 87% in misleading the object detector into detecting the stop sign as a person,
and an even higher untargeted success rate of 93% when our attack goal is to cause
the detector to either fail to detect the stop sign (e.g., at 15’ 0◦) or to detect it as a
class that is not a stop sign. The sports ball targeted attack has a lower targeted success
rate but achieves the same untargeted success rate. Our untargeted attack consistently
misleads the detection into the clock class in medium distances, but is less robust for
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Table 1: Our high-confidence perturbations succeed at attacking at a variety of dis-
tances and angles. For each distance-angle combination, we show the detected class
and the confidence score. If more than one bounding boxes are detected, we report the
highest-scoring one. Confidence values lower than 30% is considered undetected.
Distance Angle person (Conf.) sports ball (Conf.) untargeted (Conf.)
5’ 0◦ person (.77) sports ball (.61) clock (.35)
5’ 15◦ person (.91) cake (.73) clock (.41)
5’ 30◦ person (.93) cake (.66) cake (.39)
5’ 45◦ person (.69) cake (.61) stop sign (.62)
5’ 60◦ stop sign (.93) stop sign (.70) stop sign (.88)
10’ 0◦ person (.55) cake (.34) clock (.99)
10’ 15◦ person (.63) cake (.33) clock (.99)
10’ 30◦ person (.51) cake (.55) clock (.99)
15’ 0◦ undetected — cake (.49) clock (.99)
15’ 15◦ person (.57) cake (.53) clock (.99)
20’ 0◦ person (.49) sports ball (.98) clock (.99)
20’ 15◦ person (.41) sports ball (.96) clock (.99)
25’ 0◦ person (.47) sports ball (.99) stop sign (.91)
30’ 0◦ person (.49) sports ball (.92) undetected —
40’ 0◦ person (.56) sports ball (.30) stop sign (.30)
Targeted success rate 87% 40% N/A
Untargeted success rate 93% 93% 73%
longer distances. Overall, the perturbation is less robust to very high viewing angle (60◦
from the sign’s tangent), because we did not simulate the viewing angle distortion in
the optimization.
The low-confidence perturbations (Table 2), as expected, achieve a much lower
attack success rate, suggesting the need to use higher-confidence perturbations when
conducting the more challenging drive-by tests (described in the next section). Table 3
shows some sample high-confidence perturbations from our indoor experiments.
Drive-by Tests We performed drive-by tests at a parking lot so as not to disrupt other
vehicles with our stop signs. We put a purchased real stop sign as a control and our
printed perturbed stop sign side by side. Starting from about 200 feet away, we slowly
drove (between 5 mph to 15 mph) towards the signs while simultaneously recording
video from the vehicle’s dashboard at 4K resolution and 24 FPS using an iPhone 8
Plus. We extracted all video frames, and for each frame, we obtained the detection
results from Faster R-CNN object detection model. Because our low confidence attacks
showed relatively little robustness indoors, we only include the results from our high-
confidence attack. Similar to our indoor experiments, we only consider detections that
had a confidence score of at least 30%.
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Table 2: As expected, low-confidence perturbations achieve lower success rates.
Distance Angle person (Conf.) sports ball (Conf.) untargeted (Conf.)
5’ 0◦ stop sign (.87) cake (.90) cake (.41)
5’ 15◦ stop sign (.63) cake (.93) cake (.34)
5’ 30◦ person (.83) cake (.84) stop sign (.48)
5’ 45◦ stop sign (.97) stop sign (.94) stop sign (.82)
5’ 60◦ stop sign (.99) stop sign (.99) stop sign (.89)
10’ 0◦ stop sign (.83) stop sign (.99) undetected —
10’ 15◦ stop sign (.79) stop sign (.94) undetected —
10’ 30◦ stop sign (.60) stop sign (.98) stop sign (.78)
15’ 0◦ stop sign (.52) stop sign (.94) stop sign (.31)
15’ 15◦ stop sign (.33) stop sign (.93) undetected —
20’ 0◦ stop sign (.42) sports ball (.73) undetected —
20’ 15◦ person (.51) sports ball (.83) cell phone (.62)
25’ 0◦ stop sign (.94) sports ball (.87) undetected —
30’ 0◦ stop sign (.94) sports ball (.95) stop sign (.79)
40’ 0◦ stop sign (.95) undetected — stop sign (.52)
Targeted success rate 13% 27% N/A
Untargeted success rate 13% 53% 53%
In Figure 4, we show sample video frames (rectangular images) to give the readers
a sense of the size of the signs relative to the full video frame; we also show zoomed-in
views (square images) that more clearly show the Faster R-CNN detection results.
The person-perturbation in Figure 4a drive-by totaled 405 frames as partially shown
in the figure. The real stop sign in the video was correctly detected in every frame with
high confidence. On the other hand, the perturbed stop sign was only correctly detected
once, while 190 of the frames identified the perturbed stop sign as a person with medium
confidence. For the rest of the 214 frames the object detector failed to detect anything
around the perturbed stop sign.
The video we took with the sports-ball-perturbation shown in Figure 4b had 445
frames. The real stop sign was correctly identified all of the time, while the perturbed
stop sign was never detected as a stop sign. As the vehicle (video camera) moved closer
to the perturbed stop sign, 160 of the frames were detected as a sports ball with medium
confidence. One frame was detected as apple and sports ball and the remaining 284
frames had no detection around the perturbed stop sign.
Finally, the video of the untargeted perturbation (Figure 4c) totaled 367 frames.
While the unperturbed stop sign was correctly detected all of the time, the perturbed
stop sign was detected as bird 6 times and never detected for the remaining 361 frames.
Exploring Black-box Transferability We also sought to understand how well our
high-confidence perturbations could fool other object detection models. For image recog-
nition, it is known that high-confidence targeted attacks fail to transfer [12].
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Table 3: Sample high-confidence perturbations from indoor experiments. For complete
experiment results, please refer to Table 1.
Dist. Angle Target: person Target: sports ball Untargeted
40’ 0◦
10’ 0◦
10’ 30◦
5’ 60◦
To this end, we fed our high-confidence perturbations into 8 other MS-COCO-
trained models from the Tensorflow detection model zoo7. Table 4 shows how well
our perturbation generated from the Faster R-CNN Inception-V2 transfer to other mod-
els. To better understand transferability, we examined the worse case. That is, if a model
successfully detects a stop sign in the image, we say the perturbation has failed to trans-
fer or attack that model. We report the number of images (of the 15 angle-distance
images in our indoor experiments) where a model successfully detected a stop sign
with at least 30% confidence. We also report the maximum confidence of all of those
detected stop sign.
Table 4 shows the lack of transferability of our generated perturbations. The untar-
geted perturbation fails to transfer most of the time, followed by the sports ball perturba-
tion, and finally the person perturbation. The models most susceptible to transferability
were the Faster R-CNN Inception-ResNet-V2 model, followed by the SSD MobileNet-
V2 model. Iterative attacks on image recognition also usually fail to transfer [12], so it is
not surprising that our attacks fail to transfer as well. We leave the thorough exploration
of transferability as future work.
7 https://github.com/tensorflow/models/blob/master/research/
object_detection/g3doc/detection_model_zoo.md
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Fig. 4: Snapshots of the drive-by test results. In (a), the person perturbation was detected
47% of the frames as a person and only once as a stop sign. The perturbation in (b) was
detected 36% of the time as a sports ball and never as a stop sign. The untargeted
perturbation in (c) was detected as bird 6 times and never detected as a stop sign or
anything else for the remaining frames.
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Table 4: Black-box transferability of our 3 perturbations. We report the number of im-
ages (of the 15 angle-distance images) that failed to transfer to the specified model. We
consider the detection of any stop sign a “failure to transfer.” Our perturbations fail to
transfer for most models, most likely due to the iterative nature of our attack.
Model person (conf.) sports ball (conf.) untargeted (conf.)
Faster R-CNN Inception-V2 3 (.93) 1 (.70) 5 (0.91)
SSD MobileNet-V2 2 (.69) 8 (.96) 15 (1.00)
SSD Inception-V2 11 (1.00) 14 (.99) 15 (1.00)
R-FCN ResNet-101 4 (.82) 10 (.85) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN ResNet-50 13 (.00) 15 (1.00) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN ResNet-101 15 (.99) 13 (.97) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN Inc-Res-V2 1 (.70) 0 (.00) 12 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN NASNet 14 (1.00) 15 (1.00) 15 (1.00)
Fig. 5: Example stop signs from the MS-COCO dataset. Stop signs can vary by lan-
guage, by degree of occlusion by stickers or modification by graffiti, or just elements
of the weather. Each stop sign in the images is correctly detected by the object detector
with high confidence (99%, 99%, 99%, and 64%, respectively).
6 Discussion & Future Work
There is considerable variation in the physical world that real systems will have to deal
with. Figure 5 shows a curated set of non-standard examples of stop signs from the
MS-COCO dataset8. The examples show stop signs in a different language, or that have
graffiti or stickers applied to them, or that have been occluded by the elements. In each
of these cases, it is very unlikely a human would misinterpret the sign as anything else
but a stop sign. They each have the characteristic octagonal shape and are predominantly
red in color. Yet, the object detector sees something else.
Unlike previous work on adversarial examples for image recognition, our adversar-
ial perturbations are overt. They, like the examples in Figure 5, exhibit large deviations
from the standard stop sign. A human would probably notice these large deviations,
and a trained human might even guess they were constructed to be adversarial. But
they probably would not be fooled by our perturbations. However an automated-system
8 Full resolution images of the examples in Figure 5 can be found at: http:
//cocodataset.org/#explore?id=315605, http://cocodataset.org/
#explore?id=214450, http://cocodataset.org/#explore?id=547465,
and http://cocodataset.org/#explore?id=559484
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using an off-the-shelf object detector would be fooled, as our results show. Our digital
perturbation shown in Figure 2e does look like a baseball or tennis ball has been painted
on the upper right hand corner. Figure 4b shows how the object detector detects this part
of the image as a sports ball with high confidence. This might seem unfair, but attack-
ers have much latitude when these kind of models are deployed in automated systems.
Even in non-automated systems a human might not think anything of Figure 2d because
it does not exhibit any recognizable person-like features.
Attackers might also generate perturbations without restricting the shape and color,
and attach them to some arbitrary objects, like a street light or a trash bin. An untrained
eye might see these perturbations as some kind of artwork, but the autonomous system
might see something completely different. This attack, as described in [20], could be
extended to object detectors using our method.
Defending against these adversarial examples has proven difficult. Many defenses
fall prey to the so-called “gradient masking” or “gradient obfuscating” problem [2]. The
most promising defense, adversarial training, has yet to scale up to models with good
performance on the ImageNet dataset. Whether adversarial training can mitigate our
style of overt, large-deviation (e.g., large `p distance) perturbations is also unclear.
7 Conclusion
We show that the state-of-the-art Faster R-CNN object detector, while previously con-
sidered more robust to physical adversarial attacks, can actually be attacked with high
confidence. Our work demonstrates vulnerability in MS-COCO-learned object detec-
tors and posits that security and safety critical systems need to account for the potential
threat of adversarial inputs to object detection systems.
Many real-world systems probably do not use an off-the-shelf pre-trained object
detector as in our work. Why would a system with safety or security implications care to
detecting sports balls? Most probably do not. Although it remains to be shown whether
our style of attack can be applied to safety or security critical systems that leverage
object detectors, our attack provides the means to test for this new class of vulnerability.
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